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In this Article, we seek to help guide law enforcement activities
targeting gun acquisition by high-risk people by examining two potentially
important sources of crime guns: licensed retail dealers and traffickers.
Limited data availability is a key reason more is not currently known about
how criminals obtain guns. This Article assembles a unique dataset that
combines five years (2009–2013) of crime gun trace requests submitted to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) National
Tracing Center (NTC) by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), linked to
other CPD data sources about the person who was caught with the gun.
From these data, we are able to identify which of the violators are or have
been gang members and to compare their guns with those of violators who
are not gang members. We focus in particular on how gang members
obtain guns, since this population is at the highest risk for shooting
someone and for being shot. We hypothesize that gang members may differ
from others in how they access guns. This hypothesis could help explain
why our earlier work found that the underground gun market as a whole in
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Chicago is characterized by high transaction costs that keep many
criminals from becoming armed, yet the vast majority of the city’s
homicides are committed with guns. Our first finding is that the guns
confiscated by the police from gang members tend to be quite old—a
median age of over ten years—with every indication that they have gone
through a series of transactions before being acquired by the current
owner. It is very rare for these guns to be purchased new from a gun dealer
in a documented sale (occurring in less than 2% of circumstances). Besides
the age of the guns, the most striking fact about gang guns is that most
come from out of state. Even for new guns, fully 60% are imported. It
appears that while licensed dealers may play some small direct role in
arming gang members, other intermediaries are far more important. If
enforcement is to be effective at reducing access to guns by gang members,
a likely focus is on the intermediaries in the underground market—straw
purchasers, brokers, and traffickers. Gathering information on these
intermediaries will require interviews with the violators in addition to
further analysis of trace data.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 719
I. GUN TRANSACTIONS, LICIT AND ILLICIT ............................................... 726
II. FIREARMS TRACE DATA ....................................................................... 732
III. RETAIL DEALERS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF GUNS TO VIOLATORS ..... 737
A. Age of Guns .............................................................................. 738
B. Direct Purchase of New Guns from Gun Dealers ...................... 739
C. Indicators of Straw Purchase and Diversion by Dealers ........... 743
IV. GUN TRAFFICKING TO GANG MEMBERS ............................................. 745
A. Geography of Sources of Gang Guns ........................................ 747
B. Are Particular Dealers Relatively Important in Supplying
Gang Guns?............................................................................. 749
C. Prevalence of Guns with Obliterated Serial Numbers ............... 750
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 751
APPENDICES .............................................................................................. 755

2015]

SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS IN CHICAGO

719

INTRODUCTION1
In 2011, nearly half a million people were the victims of gun crime in
the United States, according to data from the National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS).2 The annual social cost of gun violence in America may
be on the order of $100 billion per year;3 these harms are concentrated
disproportionately in America’s largest urban areas that are home to some
of society’s most economically and socially vulnerable members. 4 For
example, in the City of Chicago, the study site for this Article, the homicide
rate has averaged from sixteen to eighteen per one hundred thousand people
in recent years—about three times the national average.5 This citywide rate
masks large and persistent geographic differences. Some communities
experience zero homicides in a typical year; meanwhile, some of the most
1

This Article was prepared for a special symposium entitled Guns in America organized
by the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology at Northwestern University School of Law.
The work reported on here was supported by operating grants to the University of Chicago
from the MacArthur and McCormick foundations, as well as project grants from the Joyce
and McCormick foundations and the Fund for a Safer Future. Our thanks to Roseanna
Ander, Mark Jones, Susan Parker, Dan Rosenbaum, and Matthew Smith for valuable
assistance and comments, and to the Chicago Police Department for making the crime-gun
trace data analyzed in this paper available to our team. We also thank the Journal staff,
particularly Carolyn Hill, Sarah Halbach, Cristina Law, Abigail Leinsdorf, Bobby Murphy,
and Vanessa Szalapski for their assistance in preparing this article for publication. Any
errors and all opinions are of course our own.
2
Gun Violence, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/
Pages/welcome.aspx (last modified Apr. 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8L3U-R2TU.
3
PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 11 (2000).
4
See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 29 (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QA5YQM2A; see also CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 14 (2013), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3Q5Y-ENS5.
5
The homicide rates for the United States and Chicago specifically equaled 4.7 and 18.5
in 2012, 4.7 and 15.9 in 2011, and 4.8 and 16.0 in 2010 (all rates per 100,000 people). See
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
STATISTICS, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm (last visited May 29,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7Z2X-T96T (for the national homicide rate, follow “All
States and U.S. Total,” then follow “One year of data,” then under “a. Choose one or more
states” select “United States – Total,” and under “b. Choose one or more variable groups”
select “Number of violent crimes,” and under “c. Choose one year” select either “2012,”
“2011,” or “2010” and follow “Get Table”; for the Chicago homicide rate, follow “Larger
Agencies,” then follow “One year of data,” then select “Cities 1,000,000 or over” and follow
“Next,” then under “a. Choose one or more agencies” select “IL – Chicago Police Dept,” and
under “b. Choose one or more variable groups” select “Number of violent crimes,” and
under “c. Choose one year” select “2012,” “2011,” or “2010” and follow “Get Table”).
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violent neighborhoods experience homicide rates of thirty to ninety per one
hundred thousand people.6
Gun involvement greatly enhances the social costs of violent crime by
enhancing the lethality of interpersonal violence: gun assaults are over
thirteen times more lethal than criminal attacks involving knives,7 and much
more lethal still compared to attacks in which no weapon is used at all. 8
One indication of the relative lethality of guns compared to other weapons
commonly used in violent crime is their overrepresentation in homicides
(68% nationwide), compared to robberies (41%) or aggravated assaults
(21%).9 There is considerable evidence that the heightened “case fatality
rate” for gun attacks is partly due to the ease of killing with a gun
(compared to a knife or club), rather than to difference in the assailant’s
intent.10
6
The homicide rates in 2011 and 2012 were 30.5 and 36.5 per 100,000 people in the
Austin neighborhood on Chicago’s west side, 91.3 and 59.2 in the south-side Englewood
neighborhood, and 53.9 and 77.0 in Woodlawn, the neighborhood directly south of the
University of Chicago’s Hyde Park campus. Crimes  2001 to Present, CITY OF CHI. DATA
PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Crimes-2001-to-present/ijzp-q8t2 (last
visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/C37B-4MQT (data calculated using Stata
analysis package); City of Chicago Census 2010 and 2000, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/zlup/Zoning_Main_Page/Publications/
Census_2010_Community_Area_Profiles/Census_2010_and_2000_CA_Populations.pdf
(last visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8A8L-MBPV.
7
This statistic is based on an original computation utilizing online data from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and addresses homicide and assault data from 2011. See NAT’L
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
FATAL INJURY REPORTS, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL, 19992011, http://webappa.cdc.gov/
sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (accessed July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N93JY228. We find that there were 11,522 deaths classified as “homicide and legal intervention”
caused by firearm, and that there were 1,797 deaths in this category caused by “cut/pierce.”
Id. We find that there were 55,544 injuries classified as “assault – all” caused by firearm,
and 135,525 nonfatal injuries in this category caused by “cut-pierce.” See NAT’L CTR. FOR
INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
NONFATAL
INJURY
REPORTS,
20012011,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/
mortrate10_us.html (accessed July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KK9C-CNVW. All
of these injuries were treated in an emergency department. Id. The case fatality rate for
firearm assaults is then computed as 11,522/(11,522 + 55,544)=17.18%. The case fatality
rate for “cut/pierce” assaults is computed as 1,797/(1,797 + 135,525)=1.31%. The ratio of
these two results is 17.18/1.31=13.1.
8
JEFFREY A. ROTH, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE 1 (Feb. 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145533NCJRS.pdf,
available at http://perma.cc/8Z25-7NB3.
9
COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 2.
10
On the lethality of firearms, see Philip J. Cook, The Technology of Personal Violence,
14 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1314 (1991); Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent
Killing?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 724–25 (1968); Franklin E. Zimring, The Medium Is the
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The greater availability of guns in America provides one possible
explanation for a striking pattern. Overall U.S. rates of violent crime are
similar to those of other developed nations.11 Yet U.S. homicide rates are
many times the median rate among thirty-six industrialized nations.12 This
difference suggests that reducing gun involvement in criminal violence
would greatly reduce the social costs of the problem, even if the overall
volume of interpersonal violence were unchanged. In short, guns do not
necessarily cause violence, but their use in violence increases the likelihood
of death.
For the most part, the policy debate in the United States around gun
violence has focused on the regulation of firearm transactions, possession,
and use—“gun control.” The chance of more stringent legislation in this
area at the federal level or in Illinois seems low for the foreseeable future.
In fact, recent judicial decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Seventh
Circuit have gone in the other direction. The Supreme Court required
Chicago to allow residents to keep handguns in their homes,13 while the
Seventh Circuit mandated that Illinois permit concealed carrying of
firearms.14 Which local firearm regulations will ultimately be deemed
constitutionally permissible is somewhat hard to predict at present.
So what can be done? One answer is enforcement of existing
regulations. Federal enforcement of firearms regulations and prohibitions is
the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Justice through the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).15 Most enforcement of
laws regarding the criminal use of guns is the responsibility of local and

Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97
(1972); see also Philip J. Cook, The Case of the Missing Victims: Gunshot Woundings in the
National Crime Survey, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1985); Philip J. Cook & Jens
Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691
(2006).
11
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 3 (1997).
12
OECD Better Life Index: Safety, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.
oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/4XY2-M35F; see David Hemenway & Matthew Miller, Firearm Availability and
Homicide Rates Across 26 High-Income Countries, 49 J. TRAUMA, INJ., INFECTION, &
CRITICAL CARE 985, 986 (2000).
13
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
14
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
15
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ATF NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK 3 (2009), https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/
download/p/atf-p-5320-8/atf-p-5320-8.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5RBM-ECQC.
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state police departments.16 As in all areas of policing, departments have
discretion in setting strategic and tactical priorities in this area and appear to
differ greatly in what they do and how they do it.17 Regardless, a key
limiting factor in shaping enforcement activities is money. General fund
revenues for U.S. cities declined for six straight years from 2007 to 2012. 18
Even in better fiscal times, the resources available for supporting
enforcement activities are finite.19 Scarce funding means that it is important
for local policymakers to focus enforcement activities on those tactics and
strategies that generate the largest social good per dollar spent, which in
turn requires guidance from the best available data and empirical evidence.
In this Article, we seek to help guide enforcement activities intended
to reduce gang members’ access to guns by investigating two potentially
important sources—licensed retail dealers and traffickers. Our primary data
set for this investigation utilizes firearms trace data, which merges
information on the original sources of guns confiscated by the Chicago
Police Department (CPD) with criminal history data on those who were
arrested in conjunction with the confiscation. More specifically, this data
set consists of crime gun trace requests submitted to ATF’s National
Tracing Center (NTC) by the CPD over the course of a five-year period
(2009–2013), which our team then linked to other CPD administrative data
sources about the person who was caught with the gun—including their
prior criminal history and any gang affiliation.
These data on each person caught with a crime gun, including that
person’s identified gang affiliation, are particularly important to help
answer a puzzle raised by some of our previous work. In our 2007 article
Underground Gun Markets, we found evidence that guns are surprisingly
difficult to obtain in the underground gun market in Chicago.20 This
evidence includes substantial price markups for guns on the street relative
16
See generally John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced
Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207–65
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000). This chapter describes the wide range of
policing strategies that different departments across the United States adopted over the
course of the 1990s.
17
Id.
18
MICHAEL A. PAGANO & CHRISTIANA MCFARLAND, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
RESEARCH BRIEF ON AMERICA’S CITIES: CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 2013, at 2 (2013), http://
www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20Innovation/Finance/
Final_CFC2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HSB8-VCMV.
19 See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT
OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE AGENCIES 2 (2011), available at http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e101113406_Economic%20Impact.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3NLJ-R7D5.
20
Philip J. Cook et al., Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588, F590 (2007).
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to the purchase price in legal transactions, substantial legal or physical risk
and delays for criminals in their attempts to get a gun, and the existence of a
system of retail brokers who charge a fee to facilitate exchanges between
gun buyers and sellers.21 Yet despite the difficulty for most people in
getting guns on the streets, roughly four in five homicides in Chicago are
committed with guns.22 One way to reconcile this apparent contradiction is
the hypothesis that those people at highest risk for involvement in
shootingsin Chicago, mostly gang membershave more ready access to
guns than does the average delinquent or criminal.
“Dirty dealers”—that is, dealers who intentionally violate the law—
appear to account for a small share of all crime guns that wind up in the
hands of gang members. Guns carried by gang members tend to be quite
old—over ten years old on average—and to have changed hands many
times. Direct, well-documented sales of guns by dealers to gang members
account for less than 2% of the total. Of course, dealers may be supplying
gang members through other types of transactions that are not observable
using trace data: straw purchases, undocumented sales, transactions
involving used guns, or theft. We do not find much evidence for large-scale
illegal diversion of inventory by gun dealers. Our data do provide
suggestive evidence, however, that when gang members are carrying new
guns, those guns are relatively likely to come from a “straw purchase,” in
which someone (often assumed to be a girlfriend or wife) buys a gun on
behalf of someone else who is legally prohibited from owning a gun. We
also find that gun trafficking may be a more important source of guns to
gang members than to other gun violators.
We find that only a small percentage of crime guns were directly
obtained new from a Federal Firearms License (FFL) dealer in a
documented sale.23 This pattern holds true for crime guns confiscated from
gang members as well as non-gang members. One challenge with

21

Id. at F594–96.
CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CHICAGO MURDER ANALYSIS 25 (2011), https://
portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Murder
%20Reports/MA11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8XM3-NCUM. From 1991 to 2011, the
percent of homicides commited by shooting ranged from 69.0% to 83.4%. The previous ten
years of available data (2002–2011) show that 78.98% of Chicago's homicides are
committed with firearms. Id.
23
Sales of used guns by FFLs cannot be identified from trace data. The rules governing
transactions by FFLs are not affected by whether the gun is new or used. Yet the normal
trace process only reaches the first sale. This process follows the supply chain using the
serial number of the gun to the point of a first-sale 4473. There is no way to determine
whether the gun was sold again by an FFL, let alone by which FFL.
22
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estimating this percentage from administrative data sources is matching
individually-identifying information in the ATF crime-gun trace data to
CPD arrest records and other data sources, given the presence of data entry
errors and missing data. We use probabilistic match techniques and
estimate that 11% of adults acquired their crime guns new from an FFL
dealer in a documented sale. This estimate is quite close to a comparable
estimate (11.4%) based on the most recent national survey of adult
prisoners, which was conducted in 2004.24
We also find that relatively few crime guns wind up in the hands of
gangs because of illegal diversions of inventory by FFL dealers, at least as
best as we can tell in our data. We use our dataset to calculate the share of
crime guns that could be traced back to an identified FFL dealer but for
which the paperwork kept by the FFL dealer was not available. We use this
as a proxy for off-the-books transactions, such as selling inventory illegally
out the back door; such transactions account for 5% of guns associated with
gang members, almost identical to the share of guns taken from violators
who are not in gangs.
Straw purchases seem to be a more important source of crime guns to
gangs compared to other types of dealer sales. As one indication of the
volume of straw purchases, we estimate that 15% of new guns that were
sold within two years of confiscation and were taken from male gang
members were first sold to a woman. Our data provide no direct way to tell
how often dealers knew or suspected that a given sale was a straw purchase.
For enforcement purposes, a major concern is the possibility that gang
members get their guns directly from “dirty dealers,” that is, FFL dealers
who are willing to violate the law by selling guns to people who should not
be legally allowed to have them—including by looking the other way
during a straw purchase. One indication for whether this is happening
would be that guns found in the hands of gang members should come from
a smaller set of FFL dealers compared to what we see for crime guns found
among non-gang members. We do see one locale where there is somewhat
greater dealer concentration for gang than non-gang guns: among guns first
sold in Cook County,25 the three most common dealers account for 76% of
guns recovered from gang members and 65% of guns recovered from
others. But for guns first sold in other Illinois counties or out of the state,
the pattern is reversed.
24

See Daniel W. Webster et al., Preventing the Diversion of Guns to Criminals Through
Effective Firearm Sales Laws, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 109, 110 (Daniel W.
Webster & Jon S. Vernick, eds., 2013) (discussing the most recent Survey of Inmates in
State Correctional Facilities from 2004).
25
Cook County is Illinois’s most populous county and contains the City of Chicago.
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Most gang guns come from central or southern Illinois, or another state
(especially Indiana), even more so than what we see among crime guns
found among non-gang members. Interestingly, Indiana sources are more
prominent for new guns than older guns, suggesting that they are more
likely to be trafficked directly.26 We also find that compared to crime guns
taken from people not in a gang, a higher share of crime guns from gang
members have obliterated serial numbers (5.4% vs. 3.4%), one indicator of
trafficking.
One clear conclusion is that most guns taken from gang members in
Chicago pass through the hands of at least one intermediary—a third party
that helped the gun move from dealer to gang member. This result suggests
the potential value of investigations focused on those in the underground
gun market who help put guns into the hands of violent street gangs.
Another conclusion from our findings is that enforcement efforts to
reduce gang member access to guns are not futile. Crime guns tend to be
remarkably old in Chicago, with an average age of 12.6 years (median of
10.4), and in fact are older for gang members than non-gang members (a
median of 11.6 versus 6.9 years). Since criminals are widely reported to
prefer newer guns, this is one indication that barriers exist to getting guns in
the underground gun market even for gang members, consistent with the
findings in Underground Gun Markets.27 We also find some indication that
gun violators are likely to have been in possession of a particular gun for a
relatively brief period of time, which also supports the basic premise of
enforcement efforts that try to reduce gun access to high-risk people.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a
review of existing federal, state, and local law that governs firearms
transactions in Chicago, as well as what is currently known about the
underground gun market in Chicago and more generally. Part II describes
the data we analyze in this Article. Part III reports our results for the role
that FFL dealer sales play among the crime guns confiscated from gang
members and non-gang members, while Part IV reports what our data can
tell us about gun trafficking, which we define as importing guns into
Chicago for illicit distribution in the informal or underground market. The
Conclusion discusses the limitations of the data sources and analyses

26

In principle, some of what appears to be trafficking in these data could instead be the
result of people buying guns in some other state, then moving to Chicago and having their
gun stolen. But, as we demonstrate below, theft from new immigrants cannot plausibly
account for any but a trivial portion of the total flow of guns from Indiana.
27
Cook et al., supra note 20.
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presented here and potential implications for law enforcement and crime
policy more generally.
I. GUN TRANSACTIONS, LICIT AND ILLICIT
Gun commerce is primarily regulated by the federal Gun Control Act
of 1968,28 which stipulates that those in the business of manufacturing,
importing, or selling guns must have a federal license.29 Only those with
federal licenses may receive direct shipments of guns.30 It is safe to say that
almost all guns in private hands were sold new by a licensed dealer.
Federal regulations require that before an FFL may transfer a gun to a
customer, the customer must show identification and fill out a 4473 form
that states that he or she is not disqualified from owning a gun due to a
felony conviction or one of nine other conditions.31 State regulations may
also apply, and FFL dealers are obligated to follow them. 32 The dealer
conducts a background check through the state or federal system to confirm
lack of disqualification, and then transfers the gun.33 The dealer is required
to keep the 4473 form on file and to show it to federal investigators when
asked.34 When a dealer goes out of business, these forms are to be shipped
for storage in an ATF warehouse.35
Guns are consumer durables. The original buyer may transfer the gun
to someone else by sale, loan, gift, or rental arrangement—or lose it,
perhaps to theft. In some cases, resales are through a licensed gun dealer,
who must again follow federal rules governing transactions. But private
transactions are not much regulated by federal law, with one main
exceptiona gun cannot be shipped directly to an out-of-state purchaser
unless that person has a retail license.36 Federal law bans knowingly
transferring to someone who is disqualified.37

28
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 92128 (2012)).
29
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (2012).
30
Id.
31
Id. § 922(d).
32
Id. § 922(b)(2); ATF Commerce in Firearms & Ammunition Rule, 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.99(b)(2) (2014).
33
§ 478.102(a).
34
§ 478.121; § 478.124; § 478.129.
35
§ 478.127; see § 478.57; 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(4) (2012).
36
18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (2012).
37
Id. § 922(d); 27 C.F.R. § 478.32.
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Seventeen states, including Illinois, impose some additional regulation
on private transfers.38 In Illinois, anyone who acquires a gun from any
source must have a Firearm Owners Identification card (FOID), and as of
2013, anyone who transfers a gun privately must keep a record of that
transfer for ten years after the sale.39 The City of Chicago imposes
additional restrictions: together with Washington, D.C.,40 it has been the
most tightly regulated city in the nation, effectively banning residents from
keeping handguns in city limits from 1982 to 2010, and now requiring that
handguns be registered. At the time of this Article, there are still no retail
dealers in the city limits (though new regulations that allow gun dealers to
operate in a very small portion of the city recently passed the City Council),
requiring prospective gun purchasers to travel to the suburbs to buy a new
gun.41
In practice, legitimate gun owners acquire their guns from a variety of
sources by a variety of means. Unfortunately, there is little documentation
of the pattern of gun transactions. One notable exception is the National
Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms in the United States (NSPOF),
which was conducted in 1994 and was one of the first nationally
representative surveys to ask about the stock and flow of guns in the United
States.42 The NSPOF asked respondents to describe how they obtained
their most recent gun, including whether they bought the gun (and, if so,
from what source) or obtained it as a loan or gift.43 Focusing on guns
acquired during the two years preceding the survey (19931994), about

38

Universal Background Checks & the Private Sale Loophole Policy Summary, LAW
CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/universal-gunbackground-checks-policy-summary/, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZZJ-YNCY.
39
ILL. STATE POLICE FIREARMS SERVS. BUREAU, ACQUIRING OR TRANSFERRING FIREARMS
IN ILLINOIS 12, http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/9-049.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/S824-H7WX; see also Firearm Owners Identification Card Act,
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 65/2(a) (West 2014); id. § 65/3(a).
40
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008).
41
Julie Bosman, Mayor of Chicago Seeks to Further Tighten Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2014, at A20; John Byrne & Bill Ruthhart, Emanuel Touts Monthly Phone Fee Hike
for Pensions, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 25, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-25/news/
chi-emanuel-gun-sale-plan-to-get-city-council-vote-today-20140624_1_property-tax-hike911-fee-increase-phone-tax, archived at http://perma.cc/MG8-5RCX.
42
PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS
IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS (1997),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WD9VSNPV.
43
Id. at 6.

728

COOK, HARRIS, LUDWIG, & POLLACK

[Vol. 104

60% were obtained from what appears to be a licensed dealer.44 Put
differently, about 40% changed hands in a transaction that did not involve a
licensed gun dealer, what Cook, Molliconi, and Cole termed the “secondary
market.”45 That NSPOF survey is the origin of the 40% statistic that
became famous during the 2013 national debate over universal background
checks.46

Table 1
Sources of Firearms to Gun Owners, Guns Acquired
Within the Past Two Years
Primary Market Definition

(1) Cash purchase from gun,
hardware or department store, from
pawnshop, or from seller at gun
show, flea market or military, or
through mail that respondent says
“yes” was FFL

57.0

Handguns
(N=126)
Percent
62.7

(2) Add cash purchase from seller at
gun show, flea market or military, or
through mail, that respondent says
“probably was/think so”

58.4

64.2

53.6

(3) Add non-cash transactions
(trades) with sources in (1) and (2)

60.1

66.4

54.8

44

All Guns
(N=248)

Long Guns
(N=121)
52.4

Id.
Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59,
6263, 68 (1995).
46
After the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut,
the Obama administration supported a proposal to require universal background checks for
all handgun sales, not just those involving licensed gun dealers, and cited the NSPOF
estimate that 30%–40% of all gun transactions each year in the United States occur in the
secondary market. Many opponents of universal background checks challenged the 40%
statistic, while the media had trouble understanding the estimate. For example, the
Washington Post’s fact checker, Glenn Kessler, unhelpfully got caught up in the fact that
President Obama said “sales” rather than “transactions,” although the most likely
explanation for that word choice is that some speechwriter made the not unreasonable
decision that “transactions” is a clumsy term to use in a presidential speech. See Glenn
Kessler, Obama’s Continued Use of the Claim That 40 Percent of Gun Sales Lack
Background Checks, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2013, 6:02 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-continued-use-of-the-claim-that-40percent-of-gun-sales-lack-background-checks/2013/04/01/002e06ce-9b0f-11e2-a941a19bce7af755_blog.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DJ3Q-KLK4.
45
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(4) Add cash purchases, trades with
family, friends/acquaintance that
respondent says are or probably are
FFLs

64.3

72.1

57.8

(5) Add gifts, inheritances, prizes
from sources in (1) through (4)

73.6

84.2

64.7

Source: PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA, 28 tbl. 3.14 (1996).

Guns used in crimes are far less likely to be acquired from a licensed
dealer than are other guns in private hands. Much violent crime is
committed by those under the age of twenty-one, who are barred from
buying a handgun from a dealer.47 Many adult criminals are disqualified
from buying or possessing a gun due to a felony conviction and would fail a
background check if they attempted to purchase a gun under their true
identity.48 An additional barrier in Illinois is the necessity of obtaining a
Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) card before purchasing a gun.49
One guide to how criminals obtain their guns is a 2004 survey of
inmates of state prisons conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Restricting the sample to just those that have been in prison for two years or
fewer (who can provide relatively current information), the survey data
indicate that 12% of guns last possessed by the inmates had been purchased
from a dealer.50 Most guns acquired by these inmates came from their
family and social network, or from “street” sources.51
47
In 2012, 24.1% of all arrests nationwide for violent crime were of individuals under
the age of twenty-one. Violent crimes were defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports as
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny-theft, and arson. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 2012, at tbl.38, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/38tabledatadecoverviewpdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/EXM3-V2PS. In addition, according to the 2006 Statistical
Tables for the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), for violent crimes, respondents
self-reported that 28.2% of single-offender victimizations were committed by those under
the age of twenty-one and 34.9% of multiple-offender victimizations were committed by
individuals who were all under the age of twenty-one. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 22436, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006
STATISTICAL TABLES 27 tbl.39, 34 tbl.45 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/c
vus0602.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A8U2-LHQR.
48
Philip J. Cook et al., Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders, 294 JAMA 598, 598
(2005).
49
ILL. STATE POLICE FIREARMS SERVS. BUREAU, supra note 39, at 1.
50
As calculated by authors in PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE:
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 87–88 (2014); see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND THE
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Table 2
Sources of Firearms Reported in Prisoner Survey, 2004 National Survey by
Respondents Serving Less than Two Years
Friends and Family
Illegal / street
Retail
Other

SISCF 2004
41%
32%
12%
14%

Source: Based on the 2004 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities52

Unsurprisingly, juveniles must obtain their guns almost entirely from
social connections and other informal sources, including theft, gifts and
loans from adults, and discards, as they are prohibited from purchasing
these weapons from a legal retail outlet.53 Suggestive findings from smallscale surveys indicate that guns turn over quickly among juvenile
offenders54 and that juveniles are likely to obtain their first gun from a
family member, but subsequent guns from acquaintances.55
A multipronged study of the underground gun market in Chicago
provides additional information about how youths and criminals obtain or
fail to obtain guns in this tightly regulated environment. 56 Two of the
current authors, Cook and Ludwig, worked with the ethnographer Sudhir
Venkatesh and the criminologist Anthony Braga. Venkatesh interviewed a

SURVEY OF INMATES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE (2004),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sisfcf04_q.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
PG8E-7CSR; see also Webster et al., supra note 24, at 110.
51
In 1986, James Wright and Peter Rossi published their seminal volume, Armed and
Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms, on how and why criminals
acquire firearms, using a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,900 male felons serving
time in state prisons. They found that about one in six gun criminals got their guns from an
FFL and while 75% of their sample had owned a gun at some point in their life, “only” half
of the sample reported using a gun while committing a crime at some point in their criminal
careersuggesting that gun possession may be a temporary rather than permanent state.
JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 1, 13, 17 (1986).
52
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 50, as calculated in COOK & GOSS, supra
note 50, at 87–88.
53
18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012); Cook et al., supra note 45, at 70.
54
Cook et al., supra note 45, at 90.
55
Daniel W. Webster et al., How Delinquent Youths Acquire Guns: Initial Versus Most
Recent Gun Acquisitions, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 60, 60, 66 (2002).
56
See Cook et al., supra note 20.

2015]

SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS IN CHICAGO

731

variety of youths and adults who were involved in the underground
economy in two distressed neighborhoods in Southside Chicago.57
Venkatesh found evidence that the market for guns had high
transaction costs for many participants, illustrated by the fact that some
would-be buyers turned to brokers who for a $30–$50 fee would attempt to
locate a sellerand not always succeed.58 The impression of high search
costs was reinforced by surveys of arrestees conducted in Chicago under the
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program by the U.S.
Department of Justice; the “gun” supplement in the late 1990s found a high
percentage of respondents saying that they would like to obtain a gun but it
would take them a long time or be too expensive. 59 We interpreted this and
other evidence of high transaction costs as a reflection of the nature of this
underground market, which has two key features: first, almost everyone
was aware of the fact that the CPD placed a high priority on taking guns off
the street and stopping gun sales.60 Second, the market for guns is
intrinsically “thin”; in comparison with drugs, for example, there are
relatively few potential buyers and not much profit to be made.61 Finding a
gun “connection” was hence more difficult than finding a connection for
drugs and other contraband.62
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that only about 40% of
robberies known to the police in Chicago are committed with guns, despite
the fact that gun robberies tend to be more successful and lucrative than
robberies with other weapons.63 More surprising is that almost all murders
in Chicago are committed by gun. The percentage in recent years has been
in the 80%85% range, far above the national average of about 68%.64
57

Id. at F589.
Id. at F595.
59
Id. at F614.
60
Id. at F606.
61
Id. at F611.
62
See id. at F596.
63
Philip J. Cook, Robbery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY
102, 109 (Michael Tonry ed. 2009). This number is close to the national average.
64
The national average of 68% was calculated for all U.S. homicides in 2010. See CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 7 (First, query “Violence-related,
homicide” injuries in Box 1; query “firearm” in Box 2; limit analysis to Census Region,
United States, 2010 report, All Races, All Hispanic Origins, Both Sexes (Box 3). Second,
query “Violence-related, homicide” injuries in Box 1; query “non-firearm” in Box 2; limit
analysis to Census Region, United States, 2010 report, All Races, All Hispanic Origins, Both
Sexes (Box 3)). With 11,078 firearm-caused homicides and 5,181 non-firearm-caused
homicides, the average percentage of homicides caused by firearms is 68.13%. Id.
The average Chicago gun share of homicides was calculated based on the following data:
58
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While the underground gun market has high transactions costs that
reduce gun ownership among common criminals and delinquents, the most
dangerous peoplethose who account for the bulk of the killingdo
appear to have access to guns. The key to explaining this differential access
may be the fact that the preponderance of murders in Chicago are
committed by members of organized gangs, and that those gangs provide
members with trustworthy connections from which to obtain a gun.65
II. FIREARMS TRACE DATA
The CPD has placed a priority on taking guns off the street since the
1950s.66 In 2013, it “recovered” 6,813 guns, or about 2.5 per 1,000

2011 – 83.4%
2010 – 80.5%
2009 – 81.7%
2008 – 80.6%
2007 – 73.3%
2006 – 81.5%
2005 – 75.7%
CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 22, at 22;
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2010 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 22 (2012),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/poral/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/MA10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2Q3-DT74;
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2009 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 22 (2012),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/MA09_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98VY-WPGS;
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2008 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 21 (2009),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2008%20Murder%20Reports/MA08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
8LDD-3G3X;
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2006–2007 MURDER ANALYSIS 23 (2008),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2006%20-%202007%20Murder%20Reports/06-07_MA.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/M95Q-F6LU;
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2005 MURDER ANALYSIS 25 (2006),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2005%20Murder%20Reports/Murder2005.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/A4DG-384S.
65
The Chicago Police Department 2011 homicide report notes that among the 312
homicides where the police have determined a motive, 46% are either altercations that police
attribute to “street gangs,” or homicides due to “gangland narcotics.” CHI. POLICE DEP’T,
supra note 22, at 2728. The actual share of homicides involving people who are in gangs is
surely much higher, since some homicides that, for example, occur because of love triangles,
money, “other,” gambling, theft, robbery, or retaliation could have involved gang members.
66
Cook et al., supra note 20, at F606.
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residents.67 The large majority of these guns are confiscated by the police
in the course of a search of an individual, vehicle, or residence, or picked up
where they are discarded at a crime scene.68
To better understand the sources of guns used in crime, the CPD’s
policy is to submit information about all recovered guns for tracing by the
National Tracing Center (NTC) of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). In practice, a trace request is conducted
online by filling out a form that includes the manufacturer, gun type,
caliber, and model, its serial number, and information about the possessor
(if any).69
If the NTC is successful, it returns information on the 4473 form70 that
documents all gun sales, including the dealer’s name, the purchaser’s name
and demographic information, and the date of sale. A successful trace
travels the length of the supply chain, beginning with the manufacturer or
importer, on to the distributors, and finally to the retail dealer. Each link in
the chain must have accurate records and cooperate with the request from
the NTC if the trace is to be successful. This cumbersome process can fail
for many reasons. Among the most important are if the serial number of the
gun has been intentionally obliterated at some point and cannot be
recovered; the gun was first sold before the recordkeeping requirements
went into effect from the 1968 Gun Control Act; or the retail dealer does
not produce the 4473 form.71
The CPD provided the authors access to trace data from the last decade
on the condition that it would have a chance to review any of our findings
prior to public dissemination, primarily to guard against the risk of

67
News Release, Chi. Police Dep’t, Chicago Police Recovered 6,813 Illegal Guns in
2013 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.chicagopolice.org/MailingList/PressAttachment/
Release2013GunRecoveries.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6HM-5SFT; see State &
County Quick Facts, Chicago (City), Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last visited June 21, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/W3RM-4X36 (estimating the 2013 Chicago population as 2,718,782).
68
We can see this indicator in the trace data we analyzed as part of this study. This has
been further corroborated by conversations between police officials and the authors.
69
The platform for these requests is called E-Trace and is only accessible to law
enforcement agencies. Its portal is available at https://www.atfonline.gov/etrace/, archived
at http://perma.cc/ZBJ-6E46.
70
A sample 4473 form can be viewed at the following URL: http://www.atf.gov/files/
forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E8ZN-TBK6. This form is
filled out by the purchaser and seller when a firearm is first sold at a retail source.
71
Note that if the dealer has gone out of business, these forms are supposed to be
deposited with the NTC, where they must be searched by hand.
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inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.72 From this trove of
data, we created a research dataset consisting of traces that met the
following conditions:
 Firearms were recovered between January 1, 2009 and
September 17, 2013; and
 Firearms were in the possession of an identified individual
under age forty at the time.
We refer to the sample of guns submitted by CPD to ATF for tracing
that meet the two criteria above as “crime guns.” Since the possessor was
arrested for most of the guns that met our conditions, it was possible to link
the possessor to his or her Chicago criminal record. If there was no
matching record for the gun confiscation in the CPD arrest file, we assume
the person was not arrested. If, however, there was a match that includes a
central booking number in the system, then we call that the “arrest”
associated with the confiscation of the crime gun. Appendix Table 1
reports the distribution of criminal charges for the arrests associated with
those caught in possession of the crime guns in our analysis sample. The
large majority of the arrests associated with the confiscation of the gun are
for a weapons offense such as unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) or
possession of a firearm without also having a valid Illinois FOID card. It is
possible that some of the people caught with these guns were later charged
with a more serious crime that they had committed with the gun, but the
arrest that resulted directly in the confiscation of the gun itself was for a
weapons offense.
Appendix Table 2 shows that the observed characteristics of the people
found in possession of crime guns in Chicago change very little as we apply
our different filters in Table 3 to define our final analysis sample.
Some readers might worry that “under forty” is an overly broad
category, since crime is so disproportionately concentrated among people
who are in their teens or twenties. But Appendix Table 3 shows that fully
16% of arrestees under forty are ages thirty to thirty-nine and that that older
cohort is quite similar in terms of prior record and prevalence of gang
affiliation to younger arrestees.
This analysis focuses on sources of guns to gang members. Whether
the possessor had an association with a gang at or before the time of arrest
was determined from indicators that were found in the criminal record.
Each firearm is linked to an incident number, to which one or more arrests

72

CPD data were accessed via a confidential data sharing agreement between the CPD
and the University of Chicago Crime Lab. Microdata used in this analysis will not be made
available to the public by the CPD or the Crime Lab.
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are linked in the CPD records. A gun was considered to be a “gang gun” if
the possessor had ever been arrested as a gang member in Chicago, as
indicated by the inclusion of a “gang arrest card” in the file.73 Whenever
the arresting officer has reason to believe an arrestee is a gang member
based on a defined set of criteria,74 the officer is directed to fill out this card.
In CPD’s data system, a person’s internal identification number is linked to
an indication that he or she is a member of a given gang.
As with any criminal justice data, there is surely some measurement
error in the CPD indicator for gang affiliation. Some actual gang members
are not identified in these data, while some individuals identified as ganginvolved may no longer be active. CPD does not usually change someone’s
gang membership status, although there is a field in the system that
indicates whether the person is believed to be an active or inactive member.
Because the classification of some crimes (such as illegal gun possession)
will depend on whether the person charged is a gang member, CPD officers
presumably have some incentive to make these gang classifications in a
way that will stand up to later scrutiny in court.
We treat any arrest as a gang member to be an indication of gang
membership across the entire duration of our data.
73

This indicator may not include individuals who have never been arrested or who have
been arrested, but outside of Chicago. Because of these data limitations, our estimates are
likely understating the true prevalence of “gang guns” in our sample.
74
The specific directive to arresting officers is as follows:
B. Determining an Individuals [sic] Criminal Street Gang Membership
Probable cause to establish an individuals [sic] membership in a criminal street gang
must be substantiated by the Department members [sic] experience and knowledge of
criminal street gangs and corroborated by specific, documented, and reliable
information, including, but not limited to:
1. the individuals [sic] admission of membership.
2. the wearing of distinctive emblems, tattoos, or similar markings indicative of a
specific criminal street gang.
...
3. the use of signals or symbols distinctive of a specific criminal street gang.
4. the identification of the individual as a member or affiliate of a specific criminal
organization by an individual who has provided reliable information to the
Department in the past and whose information can be independently corroborated.
5. the identification of individuals as a member of a specific criminal organization
by another Department member who has specialized knowledge and expertise
concerning the subject criminal organization.
Chi. Police Dep’t, Gang & Narcotics Related Enforcement Special Order S10-02-03,
available at http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a5752b-27112a586-d845218c69a1f912.html?ownapi=1, archived at http://perma.cc/EF9L-4XFP.
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Table 3
Firearms Submitted for Tracing by the CPD, 2009–2013
Group
1.

Guns
32,721

Total trace requests

People

2.

Trace requests for guns possessed by an
identified individual

16,026

3.

Trace requests for guns in possession of
individuals younger than forty

12,641

4.

Trace requests for guns in possession of
individuals younger than forty who were
arrested

11,206

8,900

5.

Number of trace requests (group 4) that
were successful

7,342

6,900

6.

Number of successful trace requests
1,251
(group 5) that were for new guns (< 2
years) at time of recovery
Source: CPD Trace Requests, 1/1/09 – 9/13/13.
Note: The counts in the last column indicate the number of people associated with
the trace requests. In some cases, the same person is associated with several guns.

Some kinds of information can only be determined if the trace was
successful, including the age of the gun, and the location of first retail
purchase. For guns recovered from individuals under the age of forty who
were arrested, 66% of traces were successful (Table 4). The share of trace
attempts that are successful is slightly lower for guns taken from gang
members compared to guns taken from those not in gangs (64% versus
70%).

Table 4
Likelihood of Trace Success by Gang Status

Percent of traces that were
successful
Number of traces that were
successful over the number
of traces submitted

Gang
members
63.9%

Non-gang
comparison group
70.4%

5,374 /
8,410

1,968 / 2,796

Total
65.5%

7,342 /
11,206
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Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Groups 4
& 5, Table 3).

It should be noted that unsuccessful traces are not the only problem in
using trace data to characterize the supply chain of guns that end up in the
hands of gang members. In effect, guns recovered by the police are just a
sample from the much larger “population” of guns in the hands of gang
members. That sample may or may not be representative of the relevant
individuals (gang members with ready access to a gun). If not, conclusions
reached on the basis of analyzing recovered guns, especially recovered guns
that have been successfully traced, may be misleading.75
III. RETAIL DEALERS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF GUNS TO VIOLATORS
Our first use of the trace data is to investigate the importance of retail
dealers as a direct source of the guns confiscated by the police from
possessors under the age of forty. We focus on this group because that
under-forty population accounts for the vast majority of all gun violence
that occurs in the United States each year.76 We limit the analysis to cases
in which the possessor was arrested, since that allows us to use criminal
record information to identify the violators who had a gang connection, as
explained in Part II. We also limit the analysis to guns that were
successfully traced, since those are the only guns for which we have
information on the purchaser and dealer involved in the gun’s first sale.
The gang members, who make up nearly three-quarters of the total
(4,550 out of 6,263), tend to be younger and to have more serious criminal
records than the comparison group who were not in a gang (see Table 5).
Indeed, 22% of the comparison group had no prior criminal record in
Chicago and may have been arrested because, for example, they were
discovered to be carrying a gun within city limits following a traffic stop.
We use the “non-gang” sample as a comparison group for the “gang”
sample, with the former representing those who tend to be less criminally
involved on average and perhaps less of a threat to public safety.

75
Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and
Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 278 (2001);
Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2009).
76
In the City of Chicago over the period from 2010 to 2012, fully 94% of people
arrested for gun homicide were age forty or younger (based on original Crime Lab
tabulations of CPD data).
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Table 5
Characteristics of Sample, Gang Members Versus Non-Gang Comparison
Group
Gang members
74.3%

Non-gang comparison group
59.3%

Total
70.4%

Prior felony arrest

64.4%

28.8%

55.1%

No prior record

17.1%

21.7%

18.3%

Under age twenty-one
at arrest
Total #

36.1%

19.2%

31.7%

6,585

2,315

8,900

Current arrest includes
felony charge

Sample: All people under forty who were arrested in connection with confiscated
gun that was submitted for tracing (Groups 4, Table 3)
A. AGE OF GUNS

Gang members are young. Table 5 shows that over one-third are under
age twenty-one at the time of the arrest that led to the gun confiscation. Yet
gang members tend to carry guns that have been in circulation for many
years. In fact, the median elapsed time between first retail sale and
confiscation from a gang member is 11.6 years if the gun is successfully
traced (see Figure 1). The true age may be greater still, since one reason
traces are unsuccessful is that the gun is too old. Only about 10% of guns
in the hands of gang members are less than two years old. The comparison
group of those not in a gang is carrying newer guns on average, with a
median age of 6.9 years; around 25% are less than two years old. The
overall median age of all confiscated guns is 10.4.
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Figure 1
All Successfully Traced Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013,
Time to Crime Twelve Years and Under Shown

The fact that these gang guns tend to be quite old presumably is not
because gang members prefer old guns. In fact, in interviews they often
express a preference for guns that are “new in the box.” 77 Rather, the
prevalence of older guns likely reflects what is available and affordable to
these individuals. Even for gang members, the underground market does
not work as well as the licit market.
B. DIRECT PURCHASE OF NEW GUNS FROM GUN DEALERS

A 2004 survey of state prisoners found that only around 11% obtained
their gun directly from a licensed dealer (see Table 2).78 One problem with
77

One reported reason for this preference is a concern about whether a gun has been
used in previous shootouts at which the police gathered ballistic evidence. David M.
Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a
Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 169–70 (1996).
78
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 50. An earlier survey of prisoners
carried out in 1982 found that only around one in six obtained their guns directly from a
licensed gun dealer. WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 51, at 17. See also Webster et al., supra
note 24, at 110. There are several differences with the 2004 survey in addition to the twentytwo-year time difference in which the data were collected: the Wright–Rossi sample was
collected in just eleven prisons and is not representative of the overall prison population, and
the result on guns does not distinguish between newly admitted prisoners and old-timers. It
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any survey is the possibility of reporting errors. This could be a particular
problem in this case given the potential for ambiguity about whether the
gun seller was a licensed FFL dealer or not. The potential confusion on this
point can be seen in the results from the 1994 NSPOF phone survey of gun
owners nationwide (results reproduced in Table 1 above).79 About 1.5% of
handgun owners were not sure if the person from whom they bought a gun
was a FFL dealer. Another 2% say they got their gun through a “non-cash”
transaction with a source they thought was or probably was a FFL dealer
(which is possible but seems a little odd). Even more puzzling, an
additional 6% said they bought the gun from a family member, friend or
acquaintance who they said was or probably was a FFL dealer. Another
10% say they got the gun from a source they thought was a FFL dealer
through a gift, inheritance, or prize.
The result of the 2004 prisoner survey is similar to the Chicago trace
data in finding only a small role for FFL dealers: in particular, the name and
demographic characteristics of the possessor match those on the 4473 form
that accompanied the first retail sale in just 7.8% of cases. The advantage
of examining this question using administrative data is that there is no
ambiguity about whether the seller was an FFL dealer. The drawback of
this approach is the possibility of “false negatives”—matches that are not
recognized as such due to differences in, for example, how the name is
spelled or in the date of birth. We try to overcome this limitation by
counting as a “match” not only those cases where the name and date of birth
of the first purchaser is exactly the same as that of the gun violator (i.e. an
“exact match”), but also those cases where there is a difference but of a sort
that suggests a high probability of a match (for example, that the first name
is “Al” on the arrest record and “Alan” on the 4473 form). The
probabilistic match improves sensitivity by allowing cases that do not
match exactly on all fields to still be considered. 80 In practice, the exact
matches account for 87.5% of the total.

is also true that most states in 1982 were not required to conduct background checks to
verify the buyer’s eligibility to legally buy a gun, so we might expect the importance of
direct sales from FFLs to have declined over time with the implementation of the Brady Act
nationwide background-check requirements in 1994. See Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook,
Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 585 (2000).
79
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 42.
80
We used Merge Tool Box and first unduplicated the list of all purchasers and all
possessors, then did different passes through the data “blocking” on one identifying variable
at a time (first race, then gender, then date of birth) and then matching probabilistically on
first and last name. The “blocking” involves doing an exact match on the one identifier used
for the blocking (such as race), to reduce the number of observations that the probabilistic
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Almost all of these matches are with possessors who were twenty-two
or older at the time of arrest, as shown in Figure 2. That age effect
presumably reflects the ban on dealer sales of handguns to those under
twenty-one and the lag between purchase and confiscation.81 For those age
twenty-two and over, 11.4% obtained their guns new directly from the
dealer in a well-documented sale (see Table 6). Note that almost the same
percentage of new prisoners reported obtaining a gun from a dealer in the
2004 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities (Table 2, above).

Figure 2
Percent of Firearms Where Violator and Purchaser Were the Same, by Age
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013

Direct-purchase guns tend to be very new, reflecting the high turnover
rate for guns used in crime. Figure 3 shows the rapid decline in the share of
direct-purchase guns by the age of the gun, defined using six-month
intervals. The median age of a direct-purchase gun is just 1.3 years. Since
our ATF trace data only capture the date of the first FFL dealer sale of the
matching software has to compare. Because we do multiple passes through the data,
blocking on different fields, the blocking would only contribute to non-matches in cases
where the observation in one dataset had different values for each and every one of the
variables we try blocking on, which is very rare in practice for true matches.
81
Dealers may sell rifles and shotguns to eighteen-year-olds, but almost all of the guns
in the sample—91.8%—are handguns.
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gun, we cannot directly measure the time between the transaction and the
gun violation for crime guns where the first purchaser and the possessor
were not the same person. But at least the result we do have, for the young
age of guns where the possessor and purchaser are the same person,
supports the view that guns used in crime have typically been in the hands
of the violator for only a brief time.

Figure 3
Percent of Firearms for Which Violator and Purchaser Were the
Same, by Time to Crime
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013

Interestingly, the non-gang comparison group is much more likely to
be in possession of a direct-purchase gun than the gang members (28%
versus 3%, as shown in the last row of Table 6). Part of the explanation
may be that the gang members—even those who meet the age requirement
for buying from a dealer—are more likely than the comparison group to be
disqualified due to their criminal record. The top two rows of Table 6
divide the two groups of adult violators by whether their prior criminal
record includes a felony arrest, demonstrating that that condition accounts
for part (but only part) of the difference in direct-purchase rates between the
two groups. Even among people with a prior felony arrest, gang members
are less likely than are those not in a gang to have purchased their gun
directly from a FFL (1% versus 10%).
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Table 6
Percent of Guns Purchased New from Licensed Gun Dealer, by Gang
Status and Prior Record of Adult Possessors
Gang members Non-gang comparison group Total
1.2%
9.9%
2.7%
1,610
312
1,922
No prior felony arrest
5.9%
33.7%
20.7%
852
967
1,819
Total
2.8%
27.9%
11.4%
2,462
1,279
3,741
Sample: The people who were arrested in connection with a gun that was
confiscated and successfully traced (Group 5, Table 3). The sample is limited to
people aged twenty-two and over. A “new” gun is one that was confiscated within
two years of its first retail sale.
Prior felony arrest

C. INDICATORS OF STRAW PURCHASE AND DIVERSION BY DEALERS

The direct-purchase indicator used above is whether the name and
recorded characteristics of the violator are the same as recorded on the 4473
form of the first retail sale. Dealers may be providing guns to gang
members in other ways that are not included among the matches. For
example:
 The gun may have been purchased used from a dealer, in
which case the relevant 4473 would exist, but not be reached
in the trace process;
 The gun may have been directly purchased with a counterfeit
FOID card;
 The gun may have been purchased by an intermediary in a socalled “straw” purchase, of which the dealer may or may not
have been aware;
 The gun may have been sold “under the counter” with no
documentation; or
 The gun may have been stolen from the dealer by a clerk or
burglar.
The trace data provide scant evidence on these channels, although we
can make some inferences with the help of a few assumptions. For
example, one pattern that is suggestive of a straw purchase is that a new gun
was recovered from a man but had first been purchased by a woman. For
guns less than two years old, that pattern is much more common among
gang members than in the comparison group, as shown in Table 7. Fully
15% of new guns in the hands of male gang members were first purchased
by a female. Of course, other scenarios may account for some portion of
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the female-to-male transfers of new guns: some of those women may have
been working on their own, buying guns “on spec” and selling as the
opportunity arose, and others may have simply bought a gun for their own
use but ended up sharing it or having it stolen by a man. Still, we deem
these results to be suggestive of the relatively greater importance of straw
purchases for gang members than for others.

Table 7
Sex of Original Buyer and Current Possessor, New Guns
Gang
members
15.1%

Non-gang comparison
group
5.8%

11.1%

Female buyer/
female possessor

0.7%

3.0%

1.7%

Male buyer

59.2%

65.2%

91.8%

Missing gender
information

24.9%

26.1%

25.4%

Female buyer/male
possessor

Total

Total # < 2 years TTC
714
537
1,251
Sample: The people who were arrested in connection with a gun that was
confiscated and successfully traced (Group 5, Table 3). The sample is limited to
people aged twenty-two and over.

Another channel by which gun dealers may supply gang members with
guns is through off-the-books sales or theft from the store’s inventory.
Transfers of this sort are by definition unrecorded, but there may be some
indication in the trace data from the unsuccessful traces. Some traces are
successful in identifying the gun dealer that is named in the distributor’s
record, but go no further. The failure of the dealer to provide a 4473 form
to ATF can result from the form being lost, but it may also reflect the fact
that the transfer was off the books—an under-the-counter sale or a theft.
To explore this possibility, we use an expanded sample of guns
submitted for tracing. We limited the sample to those guns that were
recovered in connection with an arrest of someone under forty, and then had
been traced to a retail dealer whether or not the information from the 4473
was obtained. Note that without the 4473, it is not possible to determine
exactly when the gun was first sold by the gun dealer or who first purchased
the gun.
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Table 8 shows that 5.5% of all guns that could be traced to a specific
FFL could not be connected to a 4473 form, and hence there was no
information on the date or purchaser in the first sale. This figure does not
differ much between gang members and our non-gang comparison group
(5.6% vs. 5.2%).

Table 8
Outcomes of Trace Requests, by Gang Status
Gang
members
61.0%

Non-gang
comparison group
67.2%

62.6%

Traced to retail dealer but no
4473 form available

5.6%

5.2%

5.5%

Other unsuccessful trace

33.3%

27.7%

31.9%

Total percentage

100%

100%

100%

Successful trace

Total

Total #
8,410
2,796
11,206
Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Group 4,
Table 3)

IV. GUN TRAFFICKING TO GANG MEMBERS
In addition to the prospect of “dirty dealers” supplying guns to gang
members, another key concern for law enforcement has been the prospect of
interstate trafficking as a source of crime guns. The nature of gun
regulation in the United States practically invites interstate gun trafficking.
Federal law sets a minimum “floor” on how tightly guns must be regulated,
with states and cities free to set stricter regulations as they wish (subject to
some Second Amendment limits that the courts are still defining). These
differences in regulatory stringency create arbitrage opportunities to be
exploited by underground entrepreneurs in purchasing guns in looseregulation states and reselling them in places like Illinois (or Chicago in
particular) that have more restrictive gun laws.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the importance of trafficking in
supplying guns to Chicago criminals comes from the natural experiment
created by the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.82 That Act,
82

Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
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implemented in 1994, required for the first time that FFL dealers in all
states conduct a background check of would-be purchasers before
transferring a gun.83 States that already required a background check,
including Illinois, were not directly affected by this provision. But
Chicago’s underground gun market was greatly affected. Imports from the
Deep South and other lax-control states had figured prominently in gun
traces for handguns first sold before 1994.84 The distribution of source
states changed abruptly in the year the new law was implemented; for
example, in an analysis of guns recovered by the CPD in the years
19961999, shown in Figure 4, the prevalence of guns first sold in the Deep
South dropped from about 35% prior to 1994 down to just 15% within two
years.85 This “iron pipeline” was largely shut down by the fact that the
Brady Act made it more difficult for traffickers to buy new guns from
dealers in the states with lax controls.86

Figure 487
Sources of Handguns Recovered in Chicago, 1996–99, by Year of First Sale

83
84
85
86
87

Ludwig & Cook, supra note 78, at 585.
Cook & Braga, supra note 75, at 304.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
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A. GEOGRAPHY OF SOURCES OF GANG GUNS

Table 9 shows how the locations of the first sale of crime guns are
distributed across different areas, by two factors: whether the violator
caught with the gun is in a gang and whether the gun is new.88 We divide
geographic locations into Cook County,89 the rest of Illinois, Indiana,90 and
then the rest of the United States.
Perhaps the strongest indicator for the role of gun trafficking in Table
9 is the importance of Indiana as a source of crime guns, particularly for
gang members. The share of new (less than two years since first sale) gang
guns that come from Indiana is 32%, versus just 13% for guns taken from
our comparison group of non-gang gun violators. The difference for older
guns is smaller. The fact that one-third of new gang guns confiscated in
Chicago were first sold in Indiana suggests that trafficking is playing an
important role in supplying new guns to the Chicago underworld and, in
particular, that many of these guns are first acquired with the specific
purpose of illegal export to Chicago.91

We define “new” as cases in which the time to crime is under two years.
Since Chicago essentially has no gun stores, this is equivalent to the Chicago suburbs.
90
Indiana is directly adjacent to Illinois and just a short drive from Chicago, particularly
from the high-crime south side of the city.
91
An alternative explanation is that Indiana residents purchased these guns for their own
use, moved their households to Chicago, and then had the gun stolen from them—at which
point the gun entered the underground market for guns and was acquired by a gang member.
See Kleck & Wang, supra note 75, at 1292–93. While this sequence of events may account
for a handful of cases, it is highly unlikely to be the predominant explanation. Surveys of
inmates about how they obtained their guns indicate that theft plays only a minor role. See
Table 2. Furthermore, the flow of new Chicago residents from Indiana is simply not
sufficient to account for the observed pattern. According to 2007–2011 data from the
American Community Survey, only about 2,000 people relocate from Indiana to Cook
County (in which Chicago is located) in an average year, which amounts to 0.04% of the
Cook County population—less than 1 in 1,000. County-to-County Migration Flows: 2007–
2011 ACS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/acs/
county_to_county_mig_2007_to_2011.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/7TKS-3VTW. It seems very unlikely that this group accounts for one-third of all
thefts and other transfers of new guns into the underground market in Chicago. In any event,
the importance of trafficking as a source of guns to Chicago is established by the natural
experiment created by the Brady Act, as explained above.
88

89
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Table 9
Location of First Purchase, by Gang Status
New Guns
Firearms Recovered Jan 1, 2009 – Sept. 17, 2013

Cook County

Gang/new
gun
30.3%

Gang/ all
guns
22.5%

Non-gang/
new
52.7%

Non-gang/
all
35.0%

Rest of Illinois

9.8%

12.0%

15.6%

13.9%

Indiana

31.8%

23.9%

13.2%

17.2%

Other states

28.2%

41.7%

18.4%

33.9%

Total
percentage

100%

100%

100%

100%

714

5,374

537

1,968

Total #

Sample: All successfully traced guns confiscated from people under the age of
forty who were arrested (Group 5, Table 3).

Figure 5
Percent of Firearms (of Total Within Gang/Non-Gang)
By Location of First Purchase, New Guns Only
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013
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B. ARE PARTICULAR DEALERS RELATIVELY IMPORTANT IN
SUPPLYING GANG GUNS?

Are particular dealers especially “gang friendly” when it comes to the
documented sales of new guns? It would be useful for guiding regulatory
enforcement to know if gangs intentionally seek out some dealers that bend
the rules, perhaps by being particularly lax in how they monitor straw
purchases, carry out background checks, or abide by any restrictions the
surrounding state may have on multiple purchases. Yet Table 10 shows that
the three FFLs nationwide that account for the most guns confiscated from
gang members in Chicago together account for a total of 27% of all new
guns taken from that group. This proportion is actually lower than the share
accounted for by the top three FFLs among guns taken from our
comparison group of non-gang violators (38%). Given the geographic
breakdown in Table 10, the only locale where gang guns are much more
likely to come from the top three FFLs than the guns for the non-gang
comparison group is the Cook County suburbs. There, the top three FFLs
account for 76% of gang guns and 65% of guns for the comparison group.92

92

These statistics are just for residents of Chicago, although they are essentially the
same when we include all violators regardless of residence.
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Table 10
Concentration of New Gun Sales Among FFL Dealers for Possessors
Residing in Chicago

Cook
County

Gang:
% from top
three
dealers
75.5%
159

Non-gang
% from top
three
dealers
64.7%
167

Gang
# FFLs
accounting for
50% of sales
1.1

Non-gang
# FFLs
accounting for
50% of sales
1.9

Rest of
Illinois

24.6%
57

45.0%
40

9.8

3.7

Indiana

40.3%
174

40.0%
25

5.2

3.8

Other
states

6.6%
151

7.8%
51

50.5

24.5

All
27.2%
38.2%
19.6
5.3
locations
541
283
Sample: All guns confiscated from people under the age of forty who were arrested
(Group 5, Table 3). A “new” gun is one that was confiscated within two years of its
first retail sale. The sample is limited to possessors whose home addresses were in
Chicago.
C. PREVALENCE OF GUNS WITH OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBERS

For a small share of the guns taken from Chicago arrestees, there has
been an attempt to obliterate the serial number that is stamped into the
metal frame. Without a serial number, it is impossible for ATF to trace the
gun back to the FFL where it was first sold. Since successful traces are
sometimes useful in criminal investigations, it is possible that a gun that is
impossible to trace has greater value in the underground market that
supplies criminals, and for that reason traffickers will sometimes attempt to
remove the serial number.93 Consistent with the idea that trafficking may
be more important for gang members than those not in gangs, the last row
of Table 13 shows that a slightly larger share of guns taken from gang
members have obliterated serial numbers (5.4% vs. 3.4%). This difference
93

See Kleck & Wang, supra note 75, at 1267 (asserting that the strongest reliable
indicator of gun trafficking is when a gun has an obliterated serial number).
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is more pronounced for those with either no prior criminal record or one
that includes a misdemeanor but not a felony. Unsurprisingly, then,
possession of a gun with an obliterated serial number is more prevalent
among more serious criminals. They or their gun suppliers may foresee
illegal gun use, and prefer that the gun not be traceable. For people with a
prior felony record, the share of crime guns that have obliterated serial
numbers is similar for gang members and those not in gangs (5.9% vs.
5.3%).

Table 11
Percentage of Guns with Obliterated Serial Number
Gang
members
5.9%
5,399

Non-gang
comparison group
5.3%
675

5.8%
6,074

Prior record includes misdemeanor
arrest, but no felony

4.1%
1,549

3.1%
1,393

3.6%
2,942

No prior record

5.2%
1,462

2.3%
728

4.3%
2,190

Prior record includes felony arrest

Total

Total

5.4%
3.4%
4.9%
8,410
2,796
11,206
Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Group 4,
Table 3).

CONCLUSION
Political passions around gun control in America are intense. Yet at
least in principle, all sides in the gun control debate should welcome
pragmatic law enforcement efforts to disrupt the illicit flow of guns to
dangerous offenders. Unfortunately, remarkably little is currently known
about how criminals get their guns due to the limited data available to study
this issue.
To examine this question, one contribution of this Article is to
assemble a unique dataset that comes from matching ATF data on crime
guns (and the people and dealers involved in the first sale of those guns)
with CPD data on the demographic characteristics, criminal history and
gang affiliation of the violators caught with those guns. One key strength
of these data is our ability to examine and compare the sources of crime
guns to gun violators who are gang members versus those who are not, and
to see how other characteristics of the gun violator (or gun store) are
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associated with the route through which a gun makes its way into the
arrestee’s hands.
Like other analyses of ATF crime-gun trace data, however, our data
are limited by the fact that they include little direct information about what
happens between the first sale by the FFL and the final transaction that put
the gun into the hands of the violator. Most traced guns are several years
old and have changed hands a number of times by informal sale, loan, theft,
or other means. Ideally, we would like “end-to-end” trace data that would
capture the sequence of transactions and in particular the transaction that
brought the gun into the underworld ambit.
It should also be evident that the sample of people caught with guns
may not be representative of the entire population of people at risk for
shooting or being shot. Another important limitation comes from the
challenges of matching two separate administrative data sources with
missing data and data entry errors. We have done our best to limit the
errors arising from this process by supplementing exact matches with
probabilistic matches. Most likely, there remain some false negatives—
cases where the original buyer was the same as the arrestee, but was not
identified as such.
The approach used in this Article provides useful insights. It also has
obvious limitations and is only a start on the larger effort. Indeed, in part
our analysis is intended to serve as a warning of the limitations of trace
data. Our research team, together with collaborators around the country, is
currently working on a larger mixed-methods project that will seek to
complement the data used in this Article with survey interviews of jail
inmates, ethnographic research on gun traffickers, and social network
analysis.
With these limitations in mind, what can ATF crime-gun trace data tell
us about how high-risk gang members get their guns? The first clue is the
most important by far: Crime guns carried by gang members tend to be
quite old. The median age from first retail sale is over ten years, and only
10% are less than two years old. The typical gang member is not carrying a
family heirloom, but rather a gun that has been circulating for years that he
probably acquired in the previous few months. Second, and closely related,
very few gang members buy their guns new from a dealer. Only 2% were
purchased directly from an FFL in a documented sale. Of course, that
leaves the possibility of undocumented sales, but they also are a minor part
of the picture: at most 5% of guns found in the hands of gang members
were sold out the back door by “dirty dealers.”94
94

The actual share is probably less because some of the 5% figure reported in Table 8 is
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The “gray area” in terms of the degree to which dealers are complicit
in getting guns into the hands of high-risk gang members has to do with
straw purchasing. We find that 15% of new guns confiscated from male
gang members were first purchased by a female—one potential indication
of straw purchasing. From the administrative data available to us, we have
no way of knowing how often a dealer could have reasonably known that a
woman buying a gun was actually buying the weapon for someone legally
prohibited from owning one, rather than buying it for herself. Another gray
area is the possibility that dealers are selling used guns to gang members
(either documented or not). We have no way to assess the importance of
that channel.
We do know that the large majority of guns that wind up in the hands
of gang members involved at least one intermediary—a third person that
helped get the gun from the FFL dealer into the hands of the gang
member.95 Besides straw purchases, we know that trafficking is of
considerable importance in supplying guns to criminals. That fact is clearly
demonstrated by the large and abrupt drop in the importance of the Deep
South as a source of guns used in crime following the 1994 implementation
of the Brady Act. Our new results suggest that trafficking is more common
for guns that wind up confiscated from gang members than non-gang
members, as indicated by the share of gang guns that come from out of
state, and the higher, albeit still modest, share of gang guns that have
obliterated serial numbers.
What do these results imply for law enforcement? The strategies
available to law enforcement officials to reduce gun access to high-risk
people fall into essentially two categories: those focused on what happens at
the licensed gun dealer, and those focused on what happens after the gun
leaves the dealer’s premises—in what we previously called the “secondary
gun market.”96 The question of primary policy interest is: which strategy
generates the greatest reduction in gun violence per additional dollar spent?
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered from the evidence
presented in this Article. We would need much better evidence than is
currently available about the relative public safety benefits from each extra
dollar allocated to monitoring or investigating dealers versus investigating
people suspected of illegal behavior in the secondary gun market.
through actual theft at gun stores, as well as some legal sales where the paperwork was just
lost.
95
Theft, which we cannot measure in our data, could be considered a case where the
intermediary involuntarily helps put the gun into the hands of a gang member.
96
Cook et al., supra note 45, at 68.

754

COOK, HARRIS, LUDWIG, & POLLACK

[Vol. 104

Obvious dealer misbehavior seems to be less common as a source of
crime guns to gang members than do secondary market sales that involve at
least one intermediary serving as a straw purchaser or interstate trafficker or
in some other role. This finding by itself is not dispositive of what the most
cost-effective enforcement strategy is. Yet it is worth pointing out that
investigatory efforts focused on the secondary market (both first purchasers
and final possessors) can do “double duty” and help deter not just
secondary market sales but also some important forms of dealer
misbehavior, such as looking the other way during sales that are obvious
straw purchases.
We hypothesized that the gang members who are responsible for the
majority of shootings in Chicago may have easier access to guns than do
other people. This hypothesis would help reconcile our findings in
Underground Gun Markets that the underground gun market as a whole has
high transactions costs,97 yet over 80% of Chicago’s homicides involve
guns.98 While we do not have direct measures of accessibility to gang
members and our comparison group of non-gang members, we do see some
differences in how the two groups get guns: gang members seem to be more
reliant on trafficking and straw purchases. But the fact that the guns taken
from gang members are on average quite old, despite the widely-reported
preference of criminals for newer guns, suggests that even for members of
violent Chicago street gangs, the underground market for guns does not
“work” as well as the licit market. Regulation and enforcement in that
sense are making a difference.

97
These high transaction costs include high price markups, long waits, the existence of
brokers who charge transactions fees, and a nontrivial chance of failure for each attempt to
get a gun.
98
Cook et al., supra note 20, at F594–96.
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APPENDICES
Table A1
Highest Charge at Arrest of Possessor
Homicide - 1st or 2nd Degree
Criminal Sexual Assault
Robbery
Aggravated Assault
Aggravated Battery
Burglary
Larceny - Theft
Motor Vehicle Theft
Simple Assault
Simple Battery
Forgery and Counterfeiting
Fraud
Vandalism
Weapons
Prostitution
Drug Abuse Violations

Gang Gun

Non-Gang Gun

Total

10

1

11

0.15%

0.04%

0.12%

119

2

121

1.81%

0.09%

1.36%

83

30

113

1.26%

1.30%

1.27%

83

70

153

1.26%

3.02%

1.72%

33

10

43

0.50%

0.43%

0.48%

14

4

18

0.21%

0.17%

0.20%

7

3

10

0.11%

0.13%

0.11%

13

2

15

0.20%

0.09%

0.17%

5

7

12

0.08%

0.30%

0.13%

40

59

99

0.61%

2.55%

1.11%

0

1

1

0.00%

0.04%

0.01%

0

3

3

0.00%

0.13%

0.03%

2

3

5

0.03%

0.13%

0.06%

4,692

1,445

6137

71.25%

62.42%

68.96%

0

3

3

0.00%

0.13%

0.03%

466

161

627

7.08%

6.95%

7.04%
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Gambling
Offenses Against Family and
Children / Involving Children
Driving Under the Influence
Liquor Laws
Disorderly Conduct
Miscellaneous Non-Index Offenses
Miscellaneous Municipal Code
Violations
Traffic Violations
Missing Information
Total

[Vol. 104

Gang Gun

Non-Gang Gun

Total

1

0

1

0.02%

0.00%

0.01%

0

2

2

0.00%

0.09%

0.02%

0

2

2

0.00%

0.09%

0.02%

0

5

5

0.00%

0.22%

0.06%

10

22

32

0.15%

0.95%

0.36%

64

0

64

0.97%

0.00%

0.72%

0

3

3

0.00%

0.13%

0.03%

2

0

2

0.03%

0.00%

0.02%

1,024

477

1501

15.55%

20.60%

16.87%

6,585

2,315

8,900

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Note: FBI UCR codes used for crime designations.
Not Displayed: Involuntary Manslaughter, Arson, Embezzlement, Criminal Sexual
Abuse, Stolen Property, and Warrant Arrests (all cells were empty for each
category).
Note: Includes individuals who were arrested in possession of weapons, regardless
of whether the weapon was ultimately traced successfully.
Sample: All people under 40 who were arrested in connection with a confiscated
gun submitted for tracing (Group 4, Table 3).
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Table A2
Demographic Characteristics Across Groups 2, 3, and 4
Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Male

69.90%

71.94%

73.11%

Missing Gender

25.86%

24.91%

24.30%

Black

60.18%

61.17%

62.34%

Hispanic

10.60%

11.44%

11.26%

White

2.86%

2.00%

1.72%

Other Race

0.52%

0.51%

0.43%

Unknown Race

22.85%

21.92%

21.18%

Missing Race

6.46%

6.20%

5.98%

Age (Mean)

29.07

24.28

23.96

Age (Min)

11

11

11

Age (Max)

97

39

39

Age (Median)

25

23

23

Note: Percentages reflect percent of individuals within group.
Note: Races may sum to over 100% due to double-coding.
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Table A3
Table 5 Split Along Age Lines (<30, 30–39, 40+)
Possessor Under 30
Gang members

Non-gang

Total

Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge

74.55%

61.72%

71.59%

Prior Felony Arrest

65.15%

29.70%

56.97%

No Prior Record

16.50%

20.77%

17.49%

Under 21 at Arrest

41.62%

25.70%

37.94%

5,745

1,724

7,469

Gang members

Non-gang

Total

Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge

73.87%

51.71%

65.32%

Prior Felony Arrest

59.95%

22.52%

45.52%

No Prior Record

20.25%

25.95%

22.45%

Under 21 at Arrest

0.11%

0.18%

0.14%

884

555

1,439

Gang members

Non-gang

Total

Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge

72.20%

45.13%

55.83%

Prior Felony Arrest

53.04%

20.35%

30.86%

No Prior Record

24.53%

26.00%

25.53%

Under 21 at Arrest

0.70%

0.22%

0.38%

428

904

1,332

Total Number

Possessor Age 30–39

Total Number

Possessor 40 and Over

Total Number

Sample: Based on Group 4 but with different ages.
Note: A small minority of individuals (7 in total) appear to be erroneously coded as
having different ages between data sets.

2015]

SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS IN CHICAGO

759

Table A4
Table 5 Split by Year of Gun Recovery (for Group 4)
Gun Recovered in 2009, Possessor Under 40
Gang members Non-gang
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge
73.82%
57.86%
Prior Felony Arrest
66.60%
28.57%
No Prior Record
16.91%
24.46%
Under 21 at Arrest
36.75%
16.43%
Total Number
1,910
560
Gun Recovered in 2010, Possessor Under 40

Total
70.20%
57.98%
18.62%
32.15%
2,470

Gang members Non-gang
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge
75.66%
55.17%
Prior Felony Arrest
67.02%
27.01%
No Prior Record
16.11%
23.56%
Under 21 at Arrest
36.74%
15.90%
Total Number
1,701
522
Gun Recovered in 2011, Possessor under 40

Total
70.85%
57.62%
17.86%
31.85%
2,223

Gang members Non-gang
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge
75.23%
61.57%
Prior Felony Arrest
63.87%
26.96%
No Prior Record
18.96%
21.57%
Under 21 at Arrest
37.49%
20.35%
Total Number
1,619
575
Gun Recovered in 2012, Possessor Under 40

Total
71.65%
54.19%
19.64%
33.00%
2,194

Gang members Non-gang
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge
76.78%
61.62%
Prior Felony Arrest
62.75%
24.04%
No Prior Record
15.72%
20.40%
Under 21 at Arrest
36.59%
21.82%
Total Number
1,361
495
Gun Recovered in 2013, Possessor Under 40

Total
72.74%
52.42%
16.97%
32.65%
1,856

Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge
Prior Felony Arrest
No Prior Record
Under 21 at Arrest
Total Number

Gang members
74.56%
61.09%
15.38%
34.47%
676

Non-gang
61.57%
25.76%
20.09%
20.09%
229

Total
71.27%
52.15%
16.57%
30.83%
905
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